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ABSTRACT
“Incentivized” advertising platforms allow mobile app developers
to acquire new users by directly paying users to install and engage
with mobile apps (e.g., create an account, make in-app purchases).
Incentivized installs are banned by the Apple App Store and dis-
couraged by the Google Play Store because they can manipulate
app store metrics (e.g., install counts, appearance in top charts).
Yet, many organizations still offer incentivized install services for
Android apps. In this paper, we present the first study to under-
stand the ecosystem of incentivized mobile app install campaigns
in Android and its broader ramifications through a series of mea-
surements. We identify incentivized install campaigns that require
users to install an app and perform in-app tasks targeting manip-
ulation of a wide variety of user engagement metrics (e.g., daily
active users, user session lengths) and revenue. Our results suggest
that these artificially inflated metrics can be effective in improving
app store metrics as well as helping mobile app developers to at-
tract funding from venture capitalists. Our study also indicates lax
enforcement of the Google Play Store’s existing policies to prevent
these behaviors. It further motivates the need for stricter policing
of incentivized install campaigns. Our proposed measurements can
also be leveraged by the Google Play Store to identify potential
policy violations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Popular app stores such as the Google Play Store and the Apple App
Store list over 2 million mobile apps [29, 38]. The proliferation of
mobile apps has increased the competition among app developers
to improve the “visibility” of their apps in app stores’ searches
and top charts to acquire new users. Creating and retaining a solid
user base is critical for maximizing the revenue of mobile apps,
mostly through in-app advertising or in-app purchases [4, 6].1
Furthermore, popular mobile apps with strong user engagement
metrics (e.g., install counts, daily active users) and revenue will also
be in a better position to attract funding from venture capitalists
(VCs) [5, 35, 62].
Developers spent more than 14 billion dollars in 2019 on various
types of advertising campaigns for promoting mobile app installs
[56]. Oftentimes, this is done through traditional advertising-based
models [16]. Another type of advertising is “incentivized” mobile
app install campaigns, where users install an advertised mobile
app and perform in-app tasks in exchange for monetary (e.g., gift
card, PayPal balance) or non-monetary (e.g., in-app points or virtual
currency) rewards [67]. Mobile app developers pay incentivized
install platforms (or IIPs) to advertise an incentivized install offer,
which is distributed to end users through a network of “affiliate”
apps. These incentivized install campaigns are orders of magni-
tude cheaper in comparison to regular, non-incentivized mobile
app install campaigns — on average, a mobile app install through
incentivized advertising costs around $0.06 (as we show later in the
paper), as opposed to $1.22 for non-incentivized installations [9].
The incentivized install ecosystem is highly sophisticated and
opaque. Incentivized installs have a poor reputation since users
(potentially “crowd workers”) are likely performing actions for a
monetary reward rather than based on a genuine interest in an app.
Furthermore, the ability to allocate specific in-app tasks to users
(e.g., creating an account, completing a level of a game, performing
in-app purchases) through incentivized install campaigns enables
efficient manipulation of targeted user engagement metrics (e.g.,
number of active users, user session lengths) and revenues. These
inflated user engagement metrics can help apps manipulate app
store metrics (install counts, visibility), which might lead to poten-
tial violations of app store policies [2, 11]. In fact, app developers
might abuse these schemes to deceitfully monetize through in-app
advertising or obtain VC funding based on inflated user engage-
ment or revenue metrics. It is noteworthy that incentivized installs
1Google Play Store and Apple App Store had an estimated revenue of 83 billion dollars
in 2019 [54].
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are banned by the Apple App Store and discouraged by the Google
Play Store. Note that the Google Play Store allows their use as long
as they are not used to manipulate app store metrics (e.g., install
counts, visibility) [43]. As a result, IIPs often do not support the Ap-
ple App Store, but potentially generate millions of USD in revenue
on the Google Play Store [7, 14].
It can be challenging for app stores to detect incentivized installs
since these installs and user actions resemble that of authentic
organic users [55]. Prior work [23, 47–49, 65, 66] has studied ma-
nipulation of app store metrics on the Google Play Store, focusing
primarily on detecting installs driven by automation or by low-cost
labor recruited outside of the app store. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there has been no systematic investigation of incen-
tivized installs. As a result, we lack a good understanding of the
incentivized install ecosystem and the effectiveness of these cam-
paigns to manipulate user engagement metrics. More importantly,
it is unclear whether or not existing app store defenses are able to
detect the manipulation of app store metrics (e.g., install counts,
visibility).
To fill this gap, this paper studies the ecosystem of incentivized
installs, its prevalence, and its potential impact. We narrow our
focus on studying the ecosystem of incentivized installs offering
monetary rewards on the Google Play Store. We measure the effec-
tiveness of these campaigns and shed light on app stores’ existing
defenses [42, 43] to detect incentivized installs. First, we perform
measurements by purchasing incentivized installs from multiple
IIPs for our purpose-built honey app that we publish on the Google
Play Store. This allows us to understand the behavior and effec-
tiveness of incentivized installs through the lens of mobile app
developers and to evaluate existing enforcement by Google Play
Store. Then, we perform longitudinal measurements to monitor
incentivized install campaigns of mobile apps on IIPs over a period
of three months, at scale. This complementary perspective allows
us to characterize incentivized install campaigns of advertised mo-
bile apps, and to understand the potential benefits of running these
campaigns.
The main contributions of our study are the following:
(1) Our measurements suggest that most of the users are crowd
workers installing apps advertised on IIPs to earn money. The
results suggest a lack of enforcement from the Google Play Store
to detect these practices since our purchased installs increased
the total install count of our honey app on the Google Play
Store from 0 to over 1,000.
(2) Through longitudinal measurements, we identify campaigns of
922 apps that advertised a variety of incentivized install offers.
We find that more than half of these offers require users to per-
form in-app tasks targeting manipulation of a wide variety of
user engagement metrics (e.g., install counts, increase user ses-
sion lengths) and revenues. These behaviors seem to contradict
Google Play Store’s policies.
(3) Our results show that there is a correlation between apps ad-
vertised on IIPs and the improvement of app store metrics on
the Google Play Store. In comparison to a baseline dataset of
regular Android apps, apps advertised on IIPs show up to 8×
increase in install counts and appear in top charts up to 2×
more frequently. Our results also demonstrate that there is a
correlation between advertising apps on IIPs and developers of
advertised apps raising funding: apps advertised on IIPs tend to
raise funding up to 2× more frequently.
(4) Finally, we find that artificial in-app activity generated through
incentivized install campaigns provides opportunities to de-
velopers of mobile apps to artificially increase gross revenue
through arbitrage and advertising. For example, more than 60%
of apps requiring users to perform in-app tasks integrate 5 or
more advertising libraries.
Our results show that IIPs can have negative effects on the app
store and beyond (e.g., deceitfully raise funding and erode consumer
trust) due to their ability to manipulate user engagement metrics
and revenue. In fact, some IIPs even openly advertise services that
seem to violate Google Play Store’s policies. Our studymotivates the
need for stricter policies against IIPs, similar to those implemented
in the Apple App Store [22, 53]. Our measurement methodology
to monitor IIPs can also be leveraged by the Google Play Store to
identify potential policy violations.
2 INCENTIVIZED INSTALLS
In this section, we explain the ecosystem behind incentivized install
campaigns and its dynamics. The ecosystem of incentivized mobile
app installs involves developers, incentivized install platforms (IIPs),
affiliate apps, users, and third-party mediators. Figure 1 describes
the flow of the offer and money in an incentivized install campaign,
highlighting the role of different stakeholders.
2.1 Stakeholders
App developer. A mobile app developer (or a third-party like mar-
keting companies hired to improve the usagemetrics of an app) runs
an incentivized install campaign by paying an IIP (e.g., fyber.com,
ayetstudios.com, offertoro.com) to advertise an offer. The offer con-
tains app details (name and app store URL), a payout, and a descrip-
tion of actions (e.g., “Install and Register,” “Install and Reach level
10”) that a user must perform to complete the offer. This offer is
then distributed through affiliate apps, where users browse offers
and select an offer to work on. Once a user completes an offer
and the offer completion is certified by a third-party mediator, the
payment is disbursed to all the stakeholders.
Incentivized Install Platforms (IIPs). IIPs provide an easy and
organized way for app developers to manage and run their in-
centivized advertising campaigns. An IIP aggregates offers from
developers in the form of an offer wall. These offers are then adver-
tised to a network of affiliate apps that integrate the offer wall of
the IIP. IIPs allow developers to scale their incentivized advertis-
ing campaigns by providing access to users from different affiliate
apps and third-party mediation services. From the point of view of
developers, there is a spectrum of IIPs depending on their review
process, required monetary commitments, and level of compliance
with app store policies.
On one end, we find vetted IIPs (e.g., fyber.com, offertoro.com,
hangmyads.com) that have a stringent review process to vet devel-
opers. In most cases, they require developers to provide extensive
documentation (e.g., valid TAX id, bank account) and make sig-
nificant upfront monetary commitments (sometimes as high as
thousands of dollars). As a result, we expect vetted IIPs to be used
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Figure 1: Workflow of an incentivized install campaign. An app developer runs an incentivized install campaign by paying an IIP to advertise
an offer which is then distributed through an affiliate app where users browse offers and select an offer to work on. Once a user completes an
offer (and completion has been certified by a third-party mediator), the payment is disbursed to all the stakeholders.
Figure 2: Screenshot of RankApp showing how they publicly adver-
tise improvement of app’s rank on Google Play Store as a service.
predominantly by more established developers who can fulfill these
requirements. Moreover, vetted IIPs tend to stay compliant with
app store policies.
On the other end, we find unvetted IIPs (e.g., rankapp.org,
mopeak.com, cpimobile.com) that usually do not have a review
process to vet developers. The barrier to entry is comparatively
low since no documentation is required and a developer can pay
as little as 20 dollars to start a campaign. Moreover, unvetted IIPs
appear to put less emphasis on compliance with app store policies.
For example, RankApp publicly advertises that their incentivized
install campaigns can help an app improve its rank in Google Play
Store (see Figure 2). This may be in violation of Google Play Store’s
policy against manipulation of app store metrics [11].
We are able to easily identify several operational IIPs by querying
Google search with relevant keywords (e.g., “incentivized installs”
and “mobile offer walls”) and by investigating relevant discussion
threads on Reddit and Quora. By reviewing the websites of seven
IIPs (that we later study in Section 4) and also attempting to register
as a developer with these IIPs, we are able to classify them as
“vetted” and “unvetted” as shown in Table 1 following the previous
definitions.
Affiliate Apps. IIPs typically rely on multiple affiliate apps for dis-
seminating advertised offers at scale. An affiliate app signs up with
IIP Type Home URL
Fyber Vetted fyber.com
OfferToro Vetted offertoro.com
AdscendMedia Vetted adscendmedia.com
HangMyAds Vetted hangmyads.com
AdGem Vetted adgem.com
ayeT-Studios Unvetted ayetstudios.com
RankApp Unvetted rankapp.org
Table 1: Characterization of different IIPs identified in our study by
reviewing their websites and attempting to register with them as a
developer.
one or more IIPs to integrate their offer walls through a purpose-
specific SDK. This enables the users of the affiliate app to access
the offers listed in different offer walls. After a user completes an
offer listed in the offer wall, the IIP keeps a fraction of the payout
and releases the remaining payout to the affiliate app which, in
turn, keeps a fraction of the payout and releases the remaining
payout to the user. Affiliate apps offer either non-monetary awards
(e.g., advertising these offers as a means to advance in the game) or
monetary incentives (e.g., gift cards) to their users for completing
these offers. We primarily focus on affiliate apps that offer monetary
incentives in our study. As we discuss next, disbursement of the
payout depends on certification by a third-party mediator.
Third-party Mediator. A third-party mediator (or attribution ser-
vice) [68] is an entity trusted both by the developer and the IIP.2 The
advertised app integrates a purpose-specific SDK of a third-party
mediator (e.g., appsflyer.com, kochava.com, adjust.com) to track
offer completion. Many of these services also offer analytics and
anti-fraud products. This mediator charges the developer either a
fixed amount or a per-user rate. For instance, appsflyer.com charges
0.03 USD/user.
2.2 Offer Types
We divide offers in two categories based on the set of actions re-
quired from a user to complete an offer.
• No activity offers require users to only install and open the ad-
vertised app (e.g., “Install and Launch”). This type of incentivized
installs can help an app developer to manipulate app store met-
rics (e.g., install counts, visibility). However, no activity offers are
2Some IIPs also offer attribution services to track offer completion. However, developers
may opt for third-party mediators to reduce the risk of fraud.
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unlikely to manipulate other user engagement metrics (e.g., aver-
age user session length) because a user who only installs the app
and opens it once (as required by the task) does not contribute
to an increase in session length (discussed in Section 3).
• Activity offers require users to perform additional in-app tasks
in the advertised app after installation. These tasks allow de-
velopers to manipulate additional user engagement metrics and
require a non-trivial amount of time and effort from users. A de-
veloper can create activity install offers to inflate the number of
registered users (e.g., “Install and Register”), user session lengths
(e.g., “Install and Reach Level 10”), and revenue (e.g., “Install and
make a $4.99 in-app purchase”). These actions result in artificially
generated user engagement that could lead to monetization op-
portunities (discussed in Section 4). For instance, requiring users
to spend a longer amount of time in the app allows monetization
through in-app advertising and increases the metrics related to
user session length. Likewise, inflated user engagement metrics
(e.g., active users) might help developers raise funding from VCs.
3 MEASUREMENTS OF INCENTIVIZED
INSTALL PLATFORMS
In this section, we study IIPs by purchasing incentivized installs
from them. These measurements not only allow us to get the first-
hand experience of IIPs as a mobile developer but also help us
measure the quality of installs (e.g., user engagement and reten-
tion). Finally, these measurements also shed light on Google Play’s
existing enforcement to detect these incentivized installs. Next, we
discuss our purpose-built honey app designed to purchase incen-
tivized installs from IIPs.
3.1 Honey Mobile App
We customize an open-source “voice memos saving” Android app
and publish it on the Google Play Store to serve as our honey app.
We add instrumentation to upload metadata to our server. Specifi-
cally, our honey app collects information about user in-app activity
(e.g., clicks on voice memo record button) and device information
(e.g., list of other installed apps, device build,3 WiFi SSIDs, the /24
block of the public IPv4 address, and signals to identify whether
the device is rooted4). This information is uploaded to our server
whenever the user opens our honey app or clicks the voice memo
record button. This information helps us measure user engagement
and characteristics of users who install our honey app. We comple-
ment our information with the analytics provided by Google Play
Store’s developer console.
Ethics.We received approval from our Institutional Review Board
(IRB) before conducting experiments using our honey app. In our
experiment, we try to adhere to the proposed guidelines in the
Menlo report [17]. However, we note that obtaining direct consent
from users would not have been feasible since it can influence user
actions and findings. Nevertheless, we provide a clear privacy pol-
icy to inform users of the nature and purpose of our data collection.
We do not collect device information that might uniquely identify
3We look for strings (e.g., generic, genymotion) to detect emulators.
4We use the open source library RootBeer [10].
users (e.g., we do not collect the IMEI/IMSI of the mobile device,
and we drop the last octet of the IPv4 address). While we do collect
the wireless network’s SSID, which can be considered personal
data, we only store a hashed value. This is enough for our purpose
of identifying whether several phones are connected to the same
network. We acknowledge that while the collection of installed
packages in user devices can have privacy risks, it allows us to iden-
tify affiliate apps that integrate IIPs (as we discuss later in Section
4) and further understand users’ objectives. We also take security
measures to protect the collected data, and communication with our
server happens over encrypted channels. We only use the collected
data for the purpose of our research. We also received approval
from our institution to pay for IIPs and share billing information
(e.g., tax ID) when hiring the services of vetted IIPs.
3.2 Measuring the Install Campaigns
We arbitrarily pick one vetted (Fyber) and two unvetted (ayeT-
Studios and RankApp) IIPs (from Table 1) and purchase 500 no
activity installs for our honey app. Our incentivized install cam-
paigns across these three IIPs are spread over time such that no
two campaigns deliver installs at the same time. We use analytics
provided by Google Play Store’s developer console [12] to mea-
sure the delivery of installs by each IIP. Note that we use Google
Play Store’s developer console to verify that we do not receive any
organic installs (i.e., installs from app store search or top charts)
during our incentivized install campaigns. Thus, we can confidently
attribute installs received during each campaign to its respective
IIP.
We combine the information collected by our honey app with
analytics from Google Play Store’s developer console to analyze
user acquisition and user engagement:
• User acquisition: Our honey app received a total of 1,679 in-
stalls, including 626 from Fyber, 550 from ayeT-Studios, and 503
from RankApp based on Google Play Store’s developer console
analytics. The completion time of the campaigns varies between
IIPs. While Fyber and ayeT-Studios are able to deliver all the in-
stalls within two hours of the campaign launch, RankApp takes
more than 24 hours to deliver all the installs. The number of
installs for Fyber and ayeT-Studios recorded by our server match
Google Play’s developer console analytics. However, our server
is missing telemetry from 45% (226 out of 503) of the installs
purchased from RankApp. This indicates that a large fraction
of RankApp users likely did not open the app since our server
will not receive telemetry data from an install unless the app is
opened.
• User engagement: We analyze user engagement beyond the
completion of our advertised offer that only required users to
install and open the app to earn the reward. Specifically, we mea-
sure how many users click on the voice memo record button (i.e.,
the only functionality in the app). Overall, we observe extremely
low engagement. In general, less than half of the users clicked on
the recording button. When looking at user engagement across
IIPs, we observe lower engagement in RankApp users: 6% of
RankApp users clicked on the record button vs. 44% of Fyber and
ayeT-Studios users. Nevertheless, user engagement quickly fades
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over time. One day after installation, only a handful of users (4
Fyber, 2 RankApp, 1 ayeT-Studios) clicked the record button.
Our analysis shows that most of the users who install our honey
app do the bare minimum effort to complete the offer. This reaf-
firms our initial hypothesis that most users are likely not genuinely
interested in the apps advertised in the offer walls of IIPs. Instead,
the majority seem to install the honey app to receive the incentive
(payout).
Incentivized Users. Users who install our honey app could be
bots who are installing advertised apps from the offer walls in an
automated way (similar to click fraud [30]). We find that some of
our installs show signs of automation. Our honey app is installed
4 times on an emulator (2 from RankApp and 2 from Fyber) and
7 of the devices that install our honey app (2 from Fyber, 4 from
ayeT-Studios, 1 from RankApp) connect from ASNs of popular
cloud services (e.g., Digital Ocean) when eyeball ASNs would be
expected. We also find cases where users seem to deploy device
farms [34] with presumably rooted devices to scale their operations
for earning money. For example, we record 20 installs from different
devices behind the same /24 block. 18 out of these 20 installs are
from rooted phones that also share the same WiFi SSID.
We also analyze 17,454 apps that are installed on the devices
of potentially real users who installed our honey app to identify
their objectives. The most popular apps among the users of all three
IIPs include several affiliate apps that integrate offer walls from
IIPs. The most popular affiliate app among the users of RankApp is
eu.gcashapp (37% users), ayeT-Studios is com.ayet.cashpirate
(20% users), and Fyber is proxima.makemoney.android (9% users).
Our manual analysis shows that the names of many apps contain
keywords such as “money”, “reward”, or “cash”. We find that a large
fraction of RankApp (98%), ayeT-Studios (72%), and Fyber (42%)
users have installed at least one affiliate app that contains such
keywords. This indicates that most of the users are likely semi-
professional crowd workers who seek to earn money through these
schemes. As we discuss later, we instrument a set of these affiliate
apps to identify other mobile apps that run incentivized install
campaigns on IIPs.
Note that we do not purchase installs from more IIPs due to our
limited budget. Thus, our results may lack completeness. Never-
theless, our selection contains at least one IIP from the vetted and
unvetted categories to reflect the dynamics of both types of IIPs in
our results.
Takeaway. Our measurements of installs provided by three IIPs
suggest that many of the users were likely not genuinely interested
in our app andwere rather crowdworkers installing apps advertised
on IIPs to earn money. These installs did increase the public install
count of our honey app from 0 to 1,000, which indicates that they
are effective for manipulating an app’s Google Play Store install
count metric. This demonstrates a lack of enforcement by Google
Play Store to detect incentivized installs.
4 MEASURING INCENTIVIZED INSTALL
CAMPAIGNS IN THEWILD
In this section, we study incentivized install campaigns of mobile
apps in the wild.
(1) We develop a monitoring infrastructure to find mobile apps
running incentivized install campaigns on IIPs (Section 4.1).
(2) We characterize incentivized install campaigns across different
IIPs in terms of: (1) how much users are being paid to complete
different types of incentivized offers, and (2) which mobile apps
are being advertised (Section 4.2).
(3) We aim to understand how different types of campaigns could
benefit developers in terms of improving (1) user engagement
and app store visibility, (2) monetization, and (3) likelihood to
raise funding (Section 4.3).
4.1 IIP Monitoring Infrastructure
To study IIPs in the wild, we cannot rely on our honey app because
it does not allow us to monitor incentivized install offers for other
mobile apps. To this end, we can either directly sign up with IIPs
using a purpose-built honey affiliate app or instrument real-world
affiliate apps. We pick the latter option as it is more scalable: it
allows us to monitor many different IIPs integrated by various affil-
iate apps. Next, we explain our approach to identify and instrument
real-world affiliate apps.
Instrumentation of Affiliate Apps.We instrument affiliate apps
to extract offer walls of IIPs that are integrated inside these apps.
Figure 3 shows the two main components of our instrumentation:
(1) We implement a UI fuzzer based on Appium [15] to automate
UI interactions with an affiliate app on an Android phone. This
allows us to milk the affiliate apps without any human in the
loop. We note that each affiliate app may have multiple offer
walls that are organized in separate tabs. Our UI fuzzer sequen-
tially opens all of the tabs to load the offer walls and then it
scrolls through the offer wall to make sure that all the offers
are loaded.
(2) We intercept the network traffic generated by offer walls on the
Android phone by configuring a mitmproxy [40] proxy server.5
Specifically, we parse the HTTP responses that are intercepted
by the mitmproxy as a result of the stimuli generated by our UI
fuzzer when loading an offer wall. These responses typically
include offer details in JSON format containing offer description,
payout, and the advertised app’s Google Play Store profile.
From the list of affiliate apps identified in Section 3, we select 8
affiliate apps that are available on Google Play Store and are fairly
popular. Using the above methodology, we instrument these 8 affil-
iate apps as listed in Table 2. These affiliate apps have millions of
installs, with as many as 10M+ installs for the most popular app.
Note that we do not automate more affiliate apps since it entails
significant engineering effort. We acknowledge that our instrumen-
tation of 8 affiliate apps to monitor IIPs may lack completeness.
Nevertheless, we are able to identify advertised apps from the offer
walls of 7 IIPs integrated inside these 8 affiliate apps. Most of the
instrumented affiliate apps integrate multiple IIPs, with the most
popular one integrating offer walls from 4 different IIPs. We note
that all of the 8 affiliate apps integrate at least one offer wall from
vetted IIPs (Fyber, HangMyAds, AdscendMedia, AdGem, OfferToro),
5Note that all offer walls use TLS encryption in their traffic. We decrypt this traffic by
installing a self-signed certificate on the Android phone since none of the offer walls
uses certificate pinning.
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com.mobvantage. 10M+ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
CashForApps
proxima.makemoney 5M+ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
.android
proxima.moneyapp 1M+ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
.android
com.bigcash.app 1M+ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
com.ayet.cashpirate 1M+ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
eu.makemoney 1M+ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
com.growrich. 1M+ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
makemoney
make.money.easy 100K+ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Table 2: List of monitored affiliate apps and the offer walls of IIPs
integrated inside them. We instrument these eight affiliate apps to
find Google Play Store apps advertised on vetted and unvetted IIPs.
RankApp and ayeT-Studios are unvetted IIPs while the remaining
services are vetted IIPs.
but most (5 out of 8) of them also integrate at least one offer wall
from unvetted IIPs (ayeT-Studios, RankApp). We further increase
our coverage of apps advertised on the monitored IIPs by running
our milkers from the following eight countries: USA, UK, Spain,
Israel, Canada, Germany, India, and Russia using datacenter VPN
proxies offered by luminati.io.
Dataset.We use our instrumentation of affiliate apps to monitor
IIPs over a period of three months from March-June 2019. We
identify a total of 2,126 offers from 922 unique advertised apps that
are advertised on 7 IIPs, both vetted and unvetted services. We
note that offer payouts use different point systems across different
affiliate apps. We normalize offer payouts of different affiliate apps
by converting their points to equivalent dollar amounts.6
Overall, we identify a total of 1,128 unique offer descriptions in
these 2,126 offers. We manually label offer descriptions into two
offer types (no activity and activity) according to the classification
described earlier in Section 2. Our manual analysis of these offer
descriptions further reveals that some activity offers are targeting
specific user engagement metrics. Hence, we further divide activity
offers into three subcategories: (1) Registration if the offer requires
6By analyzing affiliate apps, we convert these reward points to an equivalent offer
payout in USD that can be redeemed through gift cards (e.g., PayPal, Amazon) inside
the affiliate app.
Offer Type % of offers (𝑁 = 2, 126) Average payout
No activity 47% $0.06
Activity 53% $0.52
Activity (Usage) 37% $0.50
Activity (Registration) 11% $0.34
Activity (Purchase) 5% $2.98
Table 3: Prevalence of different types of incentivized install offers
and their average payouts.
users to register an account, (2) Purchase if the offer requires users
to make in-app purchase, and (3) Usage if the offer requires users
to perform any other action.
4.2 Characterizing Incentivized Install Offers
We analyze offers and advertised mobile apps across different vetted
and unvetted IIPs.
Offer Types and Payouts. Table 3 reports the presence of different
types of incentivized install offers and their average payouts. We
observe that activity offers are slightlymore popular than no activity
offers. 53% are activity offers while 47% are no activity offers. We
observe that the average payout of activity offers is 9× higher than
that of no activity offers. We further observe differences among the
payouts of the subcategories of activity offers. The average payout
of purchase offers is 9× and 6× higher than that of registration
and usage offers, respectively. This is not surprising because users
have to put in more effort and even spend money (to make in-
app purchases) for completing activity offers. We conclude that
manipulating advanced engagement metrics through activity offers
is generally much more expensive than manipulating simple install
counts through no activity offers.
Table 4 shows that there are differences in offer payouts across
vetted and unvetted IIPs. The lower payouts in unvetted IIPs are
because developers mostly advertise no activity offers on unvetted
IIPs. Specifically, one unvetted IIP (RankApp) has no activity offers
and an average payout of $0.02, and the other unvetted IIP (ayeT-
Studios) has only 29% activity offers and an average payout of $0.05.
In contrast, vetted IIPs advertise much more activity offers with
higher payouts. These findings show that incentivized install cam-
paigns on vetted IIPs are more interested in manipulating advanced
engagement metrics.
Advertised Apps and Developers. Next, we compare advertised
mobile apps and their developers across vetted and unvetted IIPs.
Table 4 lists some basic statistics of advertised mobile apps and their
developers by crawling their Google Play Store’s profile to collect
metadata such as their install counts (Google reports installs in
bins of a lower-bound “minimum” number of installs), release date,
genre, and developer details (e.g., company name, websites, mailing
address, developer ID).We note thatmobile apps from awide variety
of app genres advertised in several IIPs are published on Google
Play Store by hundreds of developers based in different countries.7
As an example of unvetted IIPs, 392 apps of 51 genres advertised on
ayeT-Studios are published on Google Play Store by 351 developers
7Note that we uniquely identify a developer using the developer’s ID and identify the
developer’s country by parsing their mailing addresses from their app’s Google Play
Store profile. Unique apps are identified by their package name.
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IIP IIP Median Offer Type Number Number Number Number Median Median Age
Name Type Offer of of of of Install of Apps
Payout No activity Activity Apps Developers Countries Genres Counts (Days)
RankApp Unvetted $0.02 100.0% 0% 152 114 39 20 100 33
ayeT-Studios Unvetted $0.05 71% 29% 392 351 44 51 1K 70
Fyber Vetted $0.19 24% 76% 378 319 40 36 1M 777
AdscendMedia Vetted $0.12 9% 91% 104 79 27 21 500K 722
AdGem Vetted $1.71 16% 84% 28 27 15 8 500K 854
HangMyAds Vetted $0.40 23% 77% 27 27 17 9 1M 699
OfferToro Vetted $0.09 52% 48% 140 131 34 19 500K 557
Table 4: Summary of Google Play Store’smetadata and offers’ metadata of apps identified on vetted and unvetted IIPs. Mobile apps from awide
variety of app genres advertised on several IIPs are published on Google Play Store by hundreds of developers based in different countries. We
also note that less-established (newer, less popular) apps are more likely to run no activity incentivized install campaigns and use unvetted
IIPs rather than vetted IIPs presumably because of their higher barrier of entry.
based in 44 countries. As an example of vetted IIPs, 378 apps of 36
genres advertised on Fyber are published on Google Play Store by
319 developers based in 40 countries. It is noteworthy that some
of the popular apps are from mainstream developers. For example,
we identify “Apple Music” from Apple and “LinkedIn: Job Search &
Business News” from LinkedIn on vetted IIPs. Similarly, we identify
“TikTok - Make Your Day” from TikTok and “Fiverr - Freelance
Services” from Fiverr on unvetted IIPs. It is unclear whether these
developers are purchasing incentivized installs themselves or if they
are potentially deceived by third parties (e.g., marketing companies)
or IIPs, which run incentivized installs to fulfill regular mobile app
install advertising campaigns [56] (as we discuss later in Section 5).
Table 4 shows that there are significant differences in the age
of the apps8 and the popularity of apps advertised on vetted and
unvetted IIPs. For example, the median install count of apps adver-
tised on both unvetted IIPs is 100 and 1,000, respectively, while it
ranges between 500,000 and 1,000,000 for vetted IIPs. As another
example, the median age of apps advertised on both unvetted IIPs
is 33 and 70 days, respectively, while it ranges between 557 and 854
days for vetted IIPs. Overall, we conclude that less-established (e.g.,
newer or less popular) apps are more likely to use unvetted IIPs
rather than vetted IIPs presumably because of their higher barrier
of entry. Next, we show how well-established apps differently ben-
efit from running activity campaigns on vetted IIPs as compared to
less-established apps that generally run no activity campaigns on
unvetted IIPs.
4.3 Impact of Incentivized Install Campaigns
In this section, we study how developers benefit from different
types of incentivized campaigns on vetted and unvetted IIPs. First,
we measure the impact of incentivized installs on app store metrics.
Second, we analyze how some developers monetize different types
of activity offers in their incentivized campaigns. Finally, we study
whether incentivized installs might help developers raise funding.
Note that some confounding factors (e.g., non-incentivized installs)
may have an effect on the advertised apps to improve app store
metrics or raise funding. To mitigate the impact of such factors,
we compare the set of apps running incentivized install campaigns
8We measure the age of an app by computing the difference between the start of the
advertised app’s campaign date and the date in which the app was released on the
Google Play Store.
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Figure 4: Install counts of the baseline apps.
with a set of 300 baseline apps published on Google Play. Our
baseline apps are sampled from the set of apps commonly used by
Lumen users [51], a crowd-sourced privacy tool. Figure 4 shows
that our baseline contains a comprehensive set of apps of all types
of popularity ranging from less than 1K installs to over 1000M
installs. Note that our sample of baseline apps has no overlap with
the apps advertised on IIPs that are identified in our study. We also
use the chi-squared test of independence [39] to determine whether
there is a statistically significant difference in improved app store
metrics and fund raising between apps observed in incentivized
install campaigns, and those in the baseline. We acknowledge that
any correlation we might find in this section does not necessarily
imply causation because there could be other confounding factors
beyond our purview (e.g., non-incentivized install campaigns).
4.3.1 Impact on App Store Metrics. We analyze whether incen-
tivized install campaigns from vetted and unvetted IIPs may be
able to manipulate app store metrics. To this end, we crawl Google
Play Store profiles of apps to collect their install counts. We also
crawl Google Play Store “top charts” that list trending apps (e.g., top
gaming apps, top grossing apps). We periodically collect this data
every other day from March 2019 to June 2019. This allows us to
measure how IIP campaigns on vetted and unvetted IIPs help apps
increase their install counts and visibility on Google Play Store.
Increase in Install Counts. For this analysis, we compare the
increase in install counts of apps advertised on vetted and unvetted
IIPs with our set of baseline apps. Specifically, we check whether or
not an app’s install count increases by the end of the incentivized
IMC ’20, October 27–29, 2020, Virtual Event, USA Shehroze Farooqi et al.
App Set No Increase Increase
Baseline (𝑁 = 300) 294 (98%) 6 (2%)
Vetted (𝑁 = 492) 431 (88%) 61 (12%)
Unvetted (𝑁 = 538) 450 (84%) 88 (16%)
Table 5: Comparing apps that increased install counts from vetted
and unvetted IIPs with baseline apps. Through the chi-squared test
of independence, we find that there is indeed a correlation between
apps advertised on both vetted and unvetted IIPs and an increase in
the install counts of advertised apps.
App Set Not Present Present
Baseline (𝑁 = 261) 253 (96.9%) 8 (3.1%)
Vetted (𝑁 = 320) 296 (92.5%) 24 (7.5%)
Unvetted (𝑁 = 484) 472 (97.5%) 12 (2.5%)
Table 6: Comparing the appearance of advertised apps from vetted
and unvetted IIPs with baseline apps in top charts. Through the chi-
squared test of independence, we find that there is a correlation be-
tween apps advertised on vetted IIPs and the appearance of an app
in the top chart.
install campaign as compared to the start of the campaign. For a fair
comparison, we monitor install counts for baseline apps over the
duration of 25 days – which is the average incentivized install cam-
paign duration. Table 5 compares the number of apps from vetted
IIPs, unvetted IIPs, and baseline that increased their install counts.
To determine whether incentivized install campaigns significantly
impact the increase in install counts, we use the chi-squared test
of independence [3, 39]. We conduct two separate tests, “vetted
vs. baseline” and “unvetted vs. baseline” to compare vetted and
unvetted IIPs with the baseline. Our null and alternate hypotheses
are:
• 𝐻𝑜 : The proportion of apps whose install count increases is inde-
pendent of incentivized install campaigns.
• 𝐻𝑎 : The proportion of apps whose install count increases is asso-
ciated with incentivized install campaigns.
For vetted vs. baseline, 𝜒2 = 26.0 and 𝑝 = 3.378𝑒−7. For unvetted
vs baseline, 𝜒2 = 39.9 and 𝑝 = 0.000. Thus, we are able to reject
the null hypothesis for both tests at the significance level of 0.05.
We conclude that there is a correlation between apps advertised
on vetted and unvetted IIPs and an increase in the install counts of
advertised apps. Comparing vetted and unvetted IIPs, we note that
the likelihood of an increase in install counts (with respect to the
baseline) for vetted IIPs is 6× while it is 8× for unvetted IIPs. These
findings seem counter-intuitive since apps using unvetted IIPs,
despite cheaper offer payouts as shown in Table 4, are benefiting
more than vetted IIPs. Nevertheless, as we discuss next, apps that
use vetted services benefit in different ways, other than simply
increasing their install counts.
Appearance in Top Charts. For this analysis, we compare top
chart appearances – i.e., their app store visibility – of apps adver-
tised on vetted and unvetted IIPs with our set of baseline apps. We
check whether or not an app appears in the top charts by the end
of their install campaign (i.e., the last day we observe them in our
crawl). To minimize bias, we exclude advertised apps that already
(a) com.mmm.trebelmusic
(b) com.camelgames.wof
Figure 5: Case studies of the appearance of advertised apps in top
charts during their campaign. The yellow line indicates the start of
the campaign and the black line indicates the end of the campaign.
Each red cross indicates the days when an app is not observed in a
particular chart and each green dot indicates the days when an app
has appeared. The y axis shows the percentile rank of the app.
appeared in top charts before the start of their campaign (i.e., the
first day we observe them in our crawl) and baseline apps that
appeared in top charts at the start of our crawls. After this filtering,
we are left with 320 apps from vetted IIPs, 484 apps from unvetted
IIPs, and 261 baseline apps. For a fair comparison, we again mon-
itor visibility for the baseline apps over the duration of 25 days,
which is the average incentivized install campaign duration. Ta-
ble 6 reports the number of these apps from vetted IIPs, unvetted
IIPs, and baseline apps that appeared in top charts. To determine
whether incentivized install campaigns significantly impact app
store visibility, we use the chi-squared test of independence. Our
hypotheses are:
• 𝐻𝑜 : The proportion of apps that appear in top charts is indepen-
dent of incentivized install campaigns.
• 𝐻𝑎 : The proportion of apps that appear in top charts is associated
with incentivized install campaigns.
For vetted vs. baseline, 𝜒2 = 5.43 and 𝑝 = 0.02. For unvetted vs
baseline, 𝜒2 = 0.22 and 𝑝 = 0.64. Thus, we are able to only reject the
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null hypothesis for the vetted vs. baseline test at the significance
level of 0.05. We conclude that there is a correlation between apps
advertised on vetted IIPs and the appearance of an app in top charts.
Mobile apps advertised on vetted IIPs appear in top charts up to 2×
more frequently in comparison to baseline apps as shown in Table
6. However, we are unable to conclude whether advertising apps on
unvetted IIPs affects the chances of appearance in top charts. Vetted
IIPs not only help apps increase their install counts but can also
help them appear in top charts. Note that even though developers
generally pay more for activity offers on vetted IIPs, it appears
worthwhile because Google Play Store places apps in top charts
based on user engagement metrics [44], which cannot be inflated
with no activity offers on unvetted IIPs.
To further illustrate this point, we analyze apps that use different
types of activity offers as listed in Table 3. Figure 5 shows the
temporal evolution of the rank of two example apps in the top charts.
In Figure 5(a), the app “TREBEL - Free Music Downloads & Offline
Play” starts appearing in the top-games chart after the start of its
incentivized install campaign using registration and usage offers.
Specifically, the description of these offers is “Install and register”
and “Install, register, and download a song.” This suggests that
manipulation of more targeted user engagement metrics through
registration and usage offers can help apps appear in top charts. In
Figure 5(b), the app “World on Fire” appears in the top-grossing
chart a few days after the start of its incentivized install campaign
using purchase offers. Specifically, the description of one of these
purchase offers is “Install & Make any purchase.” This suggests that
these purchase offers manipulated revenue through fake purchases,
which in turn helped “World on Fire” appear in the “Top Grossing
Apps” chart. We conclude that inflating user engagement metrics
(e.g., time spent in the app) and revenue through activity offers may
help apps appear in relevant top charts. As we discuss next, these
activity offers also seem to provide monetization opportunities to
developers.
Summary. Our results show differences in the effectiveness of run-
ning incentivized install campaigns on vetted and unvetted IIPs.
While unvetted IIPs seem to be more effective in targeting a primi-
tive engagement metric (i.e., install counts), vetted IIPs can be more
effective in manipulating advanced user engagement metrics and
app store visibility. Our results also show that Google Play Store’s
detection and filtering systems [42, 43] likely fail to effectively en-
force their policy against app store manipulation by incentivized
installs [11].
4.3.2 Monetization. We discuss how activity offers provide dif-
ferent opportunities for monetization through advertisement and
arbitrage.
Advertising. In-app advertising is a popular way to monetize mo-
bile apps [50]. Intuitively, there is a direct relationship between
user engagement and revenue earned from advertisements. Higher
user engagement provides developers more opportunities to show
ads, something known as “active eyeballs” in Ad Tech jargon [45].
Many activity offers require users to engage with the app for a long
time period by asking them to complete a series of difficult tasks
such as “Install & Reach level 10”. This user engagement can be
directly monetized by displaying in-app ads to the user. As a proxy
for measuring advertising revenues, we analyze whether apps using
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Figure 6: Distribution of unique ad libraries across apps.
activity offers have more capability to monetize through advertis-
ing libraries. To this end, we analyze the number of advertisement
libraries embedded in apps. We download APKs of baseline and
advertised apps to perform static analysis9 using LibRadar [37].
Our results show that apps using activity offers have more ad
libraries than apps using no activity offers. Figure 6(a) shows that
60% and 25% of apps with activity and no activity offers, respec-
tively, have 5 or more ad libraries. We find well-known advertising
vendors such as Google AdMob, AppLovin, and ChartBoost. We
also find advertisers that serve the role of IIP (e.g., Fyber). A similar
pattern emerges when comparing vetted, unvetted, and baseline
apps. Figure 6(b) shows that 55%, 20%, and 35% of vetted, unvetted,
and baseline apps, respectively, have 5 or more ad libraries. This is
expected because activity offers are more common on vetted IIPs
in comparison to unvetted (as reported in Table 3).
Our results indicate two different strategies of incentivized in-
stall campaigns. On one hand, we find that mobile apps advertised
on vetted IIPs have more advertisement libraries, giving these apps
more opportunities to generate revenue since their incentivized
install campaigns are more likely to advertise activity offers. On the
other hand, incentivized install campaigns from unvetted IIPs ad-
vertise no activity offers that do not require additional engagement
from users and include fewer advertising libraries.
Arbitrage. We observe that developers can craft activity offers
in a way that allows them to monetize through arbitrage. In arbi-
trage, a developer advertises an activity offer that requires users
to complete additional tasks within the app such as filling surveys,
watching videos, or even installing other apps (similar to affiliate
9We note that static analysis may miss some advertising libraries due to code obfusca-
tion and dynamic code loading. Furthermore, we acknowledge that our analysis offers
an upper bound on in-app advertising, as the mere presence of an advertising library
does not guarantee that its code will be executed at run-time.
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apps). In return, the developer earns money through commissions
after these offers within the app are completed. One example of
arbitrage is the following offer that advertises an app “Cash Time -
Earn Money - Android”. This activity offer pays $0.67 to users for
reaching 850 points in the app by completing additional tasks (e.g.,
watching videos, completing surveys, shopping for deals) in the
app. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate the revenue earned through
arbitrage to understand profitability. However, even if arbitrage is
not profitable, these offers would likely enable an app to increase
revenue-based metrics, such as revenue growth.
We manually analyze the descriptions of all activity offers and
find that 3.9% of apps (36 out of 922) use arbitrage-based activity
offers. We observe a higher percentage of such offers in vetted IIPs
as compared to unvetted IIPs. Specifically, 7% of apps (35 out of
492) from vetted IIPs while only 2% of apps (10 out of 538) from
unvetted IIPs use arbitrage-based activity offers. This is again ex-
pected because activity offers are more common on vetted IIPs in
comparison to unvetted (as reported in Table 3).
Summary. Overall, our results show that incentivized install cam-
paigns that advertise activity offers have opportunities to monetize
through advertising and arbitrage. It is unclear whether these mon-
etization strategies are sufficient to directly recuperate the cost of
their incentivized install campaigns. Next, we explore other indi-
rect avenues of monetization such as raising funding from venture
capitalists.
4.3.3 Investor Funding. There is an inherent tension between growth
and profitability [13] of mobile app startups. Many app developers
are more interested in strong user growth as well as bolstering
user engagement metrics because, in the long term, they can help
developers raise funding from investors such as venture capitalists
(VCs) [5, 62]. In this section, we study whether any of the 922 apps
in our dataset are able to raise funding after launching incentivized
install campaigns.
To this end, we use the Crunchbase [24] database that provides
us with access to the list of companies that have raised funding. We
download a snapshot of the Crunchbase database in October 2019
(a few months after our initial data collection). By searching for
developer information from Google Play Store, we match 23% of
922 apps to their developers in the Crunchbase database. Crunch-
base provides funding information such as the name of the funding
organization, type of organization (e.g., angel investor, VC investor),
amount of funding, and type of funding (e.g., seed round, series A,
series B). We are able to match 39% of apps (192 out of 492) from
vetted IIPs, 15% of apps (79 out of 538) from unvetted IIPs, and 27%
of baseline apps (82 out of 300) in the Crunchbase database. We
surmise that mobile apps advertised on vetted IIPs have a higher
percentage of matched developers over unvetted IIPs since vetted
IIPs are used by more established developers (as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1). In fact, our manual analysis shows that mobile apps of
the unmatched developers from unvetted IIPs often do not provide
useful information in their Google Play Store profile (e.g., link to
their website). Note that the lack of completeness of Crunchbase
database may also result in the exclusion of some unmatched devel-
opers. To mitigate the impact of this limitation, we only compare
those advertised apps and baseline apps that are matched in the
Crunchbase database to perform further analysis.
We analyze whether advertising apps on vetted and unvetted
IIPs has any effect on the funding raised by them. To this end, we
compare the funding raised by developers whose mobile apps are
advertised on vetted and unvetted IIPs with baseline apps. Specifi-
cally, we check whether or not a mobile app raises funding after
running the incentivized install campaign(s). For comparison, we
extract the same information for our baseline apps. Table 7 reports
the number of these mobile apps from vetted IIPs, unvetted IIPs,
and from the baseline whose developers are able to raise funding.
To determine whether incentivized install campaigns significantly
impact the funding raised by apps, we again use the chi-squared test
of independence. We conduct two separate tests, “vetted vs. base-
line,” and “unvetted vs. baseline,” to compare vetted and unvetted
IIPs. Our hypotheses are:
• 𝐻𝑜 : The proportion of apps that raise funding is independent of
incentivized install campaign.
• 𝐻𝑎 : The proportion of apps that raise funding is associated with
incentivized install campaign.
For vetted vs. baseline, 𝜒2 = 4.7 and 𝑝 = 0.03. For unvetted vs.
baseline, 𝜒2 = 2.8 and 𝑝 = 0.10. Thus, we are able to only reject the
null hypothesis for the vetted vs. baseline at the significance level
of 0.05. We conclude that there is a correlation between advertis-
ing apps on vetted IIPs and developers of advertised apps raising
funding. However, we are unable to conclude whether advertising
apps on unvetted IIPs affects the chances of raising funding.
We further compare the offer types and payout amounts of in-
centivized install campaigns for the apps that raise funding versus
those that do not. Table 8 presents a breakdown of offer types and
payouts of 30 apps from vetted IIPs that raised funding after their
campaigns. We observe that these apps are roughly equally likely to
advertise activity and no activity offers. However, the incentivized
install campaigns of the apps that raised funding have much higher
payouts. For example, the average payout of no activity offers ad-
vertised by apps that raised funding is twice the average payout of
all offers reported in Table 3. We surmise that the developers in-
terested in raising funding need to aggressively acquire new users,
and thus are willing to pay more.
We also look at two case studies of apps that raise VC funding
after incentivized install campaigns. First, the Password Manager
app by Dashlane raised multiple rounds of funding after launching
incentivized install campaigns. The app was advertised on Fyber
from March 12-27 and then May 7-14 using activity offers, which
require users to install the app, create an account, and save at
least two passwords in return for a reward around $0.26-$0.66.
Coincidentally, Dashlane raised funding twice, each time about
two weeks after each campaign: $30 million on April 12 [46], and
$110 million on May 30 [64]. Second, Droom: Used & New Car, Bike,
Insurance, Loan & RTO, an e-commerce app that sells used and
new vehicles, raised series F funding after appearing on IIPs. The
app was advertised on Fyber and AdscendMedia from March 14-
June 8 using no activity and activity offers, which require users to
install the app and register a new account in return for a reward
around $0.02-$0.06. Droom also raised funding about two weeks
after its incentivized install campaign: Droom raised $10 million
on 20th June [59]. These two case studies indicate that incentivized
installs could have misled investors who funded these apps (or
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App Set Funding Raised No Funding Raised
Baseline (𝑁 = 82) 5 (6.1%) 77 (93.9%)
Vetted (𝑁 = 192) 30 (15.6%) 162 (84.4%)
Unvetted (𝑁 = 79) 11 (13.9%) 68 (86.1%)
Table 7: Developers of mobile apps raising funding after cam-
paigns using vetted and unvetted IIPs compared with baseline apps.
Through the chi-squared test of independence, we find that there
is a correlation between apps advertised on vetted IIPs and success-
fully raising funding after a campaign.
Offer Type Percentage of Apps (𝑁 = 30) Average Payout
No activity 67% $0.12
Activity 63% $0.92
Table 8: Breakdown of offer types and payouts of apps advertised
on vetted IIPs that raised funding after their campaign.
the companies behind them). In the same vein, incentivized install
campaigns of the remaining apps from vetted IIPs could also have
misled investors since they also raised funding after the start of
their incentivized install campaigns.
Next, we study developers matched with the Crunchbase data-
base that are public companies [21]. Public companies generally
report their user growth and engagement metrics on a quarterly
basis. These metrics often play an important role in stock price tar-
gets from analysts and eventual stock price movements [28]. Thus,
manipulation of these metrics through IIP campaigns can poten-
tially boost the stock price of a publicly traded company. From the
matching of developers from the Crunchbase database, we find that
developers of 28 advertised mobile apps from vetted and unvetted
IIPs are publicly traded companies. For example, Redfin, a publicly
traded real estate brokerage company, reported a 27% increase in
their mobile traffic during the second quarter of 2019 in comparison
to the second quarter of 2018 [52]. Note that the incentivized install
campaign of Redfin’s mobile app (“Redfin Real Estate”) advertised
a no activity offer and a usage offer during the second quarter of
2019 as observed in our data collection. As another example, the
quarterly report of IGG, a publicly traded mobile game company,
praised its app “Lords Mobile” for staying in the top 5 of the top
charts in 54 countries during the second quarter of 2019 [1]. We
observed a total of 18 incentivized usage offers for this app over the
duration of 3 months; these incentivized install campaigns could
potentially have helped the app maintain its top ranks.
These public companies could be purchasing incentivized installs
to artificially inflate their quarterly reports. Nevertheless, it is also
possible that these companies are being defrauded by IIPs, as we
discuss next in Section 5.
Summary. Overall, our results show a correlation between ad-
vertising apps on IIPs and developers of advertised apps raising
funding from investors. This suggests that inflation of user engage-
ment metrics through incentivized install campaigns may have
misled investors.
5 DISCUSSION
Our analysis characterizes for the first time (and at scale) an un-
explored part of the mobile ecosystem, and of alternative mobile
app monetization strategies. We reveal a correlation between the
apps participating in incentivized install campaigns and (1) their in-
crease in install counts, (2) their appearance on Google Play Store’s
top charts, and (3) in some cases, a correlation with successful in-
vestor rounds. The ability of such campaigns to boost install counts
(and active users) can make apps appear more attractive than they
actually are by manipulating Google Play Store’s rankings. This
practice, prohibited on the Apple App Store, could be considered
as potentially deceptive to Android users and investors alike, as it
could give an unfair advantage to apps that are willing to pay users
for installs over those that rely on organic growth strategies.
Yet, this does not imply that apps appearing on incentivized in-
stall services are willingly engaging in such activities. It is plausible
that some app developers are themselves being deceived by third-
party marketing organizations offering mechanisms to attract new
users or improve their brand value. For example, marketers might
attempt to arbitrage advertising campaigns by charging for more
expensive non-incentivized installs, yet delivering lower-quality
incentivized installs [8]. In fact, during our measurements, we ob-
served campaigns involving apps published by well-known brands
such as Amazon, Apple, and LinkedIn. As we discuss next, we
disclose our findings to app developers.
5.1 Responsible Disclosure
We contacted the developers of popular apps advertised on vetted
and unvetted IIPs for responsible disclosure. We contacted only 136
popular apps, each with 5M+ installs, out of 922 total apps since this
was a manual process using the contact email address from their
Google Play Store profile. We informed the developers that their
apps were advertised as part of an incentivized install campaign. At
the time of writing, we have received responses from three develop-
ers, all of whom were unaware of their apps participating in such
campaigns. They also indicated that they are being defrauded. For
example, one developer indicated that they contracted multiple ex-
ternal marketing organizations to acquire non-incentivized installs.
It is possible that one of these marketing organizations advertised
the developer’s app on IIPs during the time of our data collection.
We also disclosed our findings to Google since our results in-
dicate that many of the advertised apps and IIPs are potentially
violating Google Play Store’s policy. Other than the receipt of ac-
knowledgement, we have so far not received any other feedback
from Google either corroborating or refuting our findings.
5.2 Google Play Store’s Policy and Enforcement
Google Play Store’s policy [11] states that “Developers must not
attempt to manipulate the placement of any apps in Google Play.”
The presence and behavior of incentivized install platforms seem
to directly contradict this requirement. In fact, some incentivized
install platforms like RankApp (see Figure 2) are operational on
Google Play Store despite openly advertising services that seem to
run afoul of these policies.
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Our successful purchase of incentivized installs in Section 3 sug-
gested that Google Play Store’s detection and filtering systems
[42, 43] might fail to effectively enforce their policy against manip-
ulation of app store metrics. In order to measure potential enforce-
ment, we revisit our collected data and look for a decrease in the
install counts of advertised apps after the start of their campaign.
Such a decrease would be an indicator that Google Play Store has
identified and removed incentivized installs.10 Overall, we observed
no decrease in the install counts of baseline apps or the apps adver-
tised on vetted IIPs. For unvetted IIPs, we do occasionally observe
a decrease in install counts during our data collection, but it affects
only 2% of the advertised apps. One example was the app “Phone-
book - Contacts manager” advertised on ayeT-Studios, whose install
count decreased from 1,000 to 500.
Based on these observations, it seems that the effectiveness of
enforcement on the Google Play Store is rather limited. We advo-
cate moving towards a prohibitive stance regarding incentivized
installs, similar to the Apple App Store [22], to impede such ma-
nipulation attempts while increasing the trustworthiness of top
charts and install counts on the Google Play Store. Furthermore, our
measurement methodology can also help the Google Play Store in
improving its existing defenses by detecting apps that benefit from
incentivized campaigns. Specifically, our proposed measurements
can provide a ground truth of apps to help train machine learning
models in detecting the lockstep behavior of users who perform
similar in-app activities to complete the offer [18, 20, 33]. To foster
follow-up research, we have also publicly shared our crawled data
on https://www.github.com/shehrozef/IncentInstalls.
5.3 Limitations
Due to the limitations of our methodology, we cannot currently
explore other aspects of the IIP ecosystem:
• We lack Google Play Store data of apps’ profiles and top charts
outside of our crawl dates. Having historical and precise metadata
for every app – including their presence in top charts – would
have allowed us to better characterize the use and impact of IIPs
on app store metrics.
• We lack complete visibility of the whole incentivized install
ecosystem. We purchased installs for our honey app from three
IIPs. We did not purchase installs from more IIPs due to budget
limitations. In our in-the-wild measurement, our instrumentation
of 8 affiliate apps allowed us to monitor 7 IIPs. We did not instru-
ment more affiliate apps since it entails significant engineering
effort.
• Comparing results of purchasing incentivized installs of our
honey app with non-incentivized installs would help us bet-
ter understand and distinguish the install quality and Google
Play Store’s existing enforcement. We did not purchase non-
incentivized installs due to budget limitations.
• We cannot estimate the amount of money spent by an incen-
tivized install campaign of a mobile app because we lack data
on the number of offers completed by users. We are only able
10We acknowledge that if an app already has a large number of installs (e.g., 1M), we
may not be able to observe the impact of install filtering.
to estimate the payout to complete an advertised offer that is
observable in the offer wall’s traffic data.
• Our work focuses on studying IIP activity through affiliate apps.
While other methods to distribute offers exist (such as micro
service platforms), they fall out of the scope of this paper and
require developing different methodologies that could be further
studied in future work.
• There are potential grey areas allowing developers running in-
centivized install campaigns to increase revenue that we did not
explore in our study. The completion of some in-app tasks may
require users to purchase gaming credits, virtual currencies, or
premium subscriptions, which are not mentioned in the offer
description. We would not be able to identify these tasks since
our existing categorization of in-app tasks relies on reading of-
fer descriptions. Understanding these behaviors would require
more extensive and comprehensive use of advertised apps (e.g.,
automating interaction with advertised apps).
6 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the char-
acteristics of incentivized install services for mobile apps, and the
possibilities they offer for manipulating in-app metrics such as user
engagement or revenue. Prior work addressed similar, but distinct,
areas of pay-per-install (PPI) services for distributing malicious or
unwanted desktop apps, and reputation manipulation for online
social networks and mobile app stores as discussed next.
App Install Campaigns on Desktop. In contrast to the mobile
app install campaigns we observe in this paper, desktop app in-
stall campaigns appear to be predominantly used by attackers
and malicious actors to disseminate malware and potentially un-
wanted software (PUP) through deceptive practices and compro-
mised hosts [19, 36, 60]. Caballero et al. found that such campaigns
installed malicious apps from 12 out of 20 prevalent malware fami-
lies on compromised host machines [19]. Kotzias et al. studied the
presence of potentially unwanted software distributed through app
install campaigns and detected at least one sample of potentially un-
wanted software on 54% of 9 million hosts [36]. These services rely
on deceptive practices such as drive-by downloads [41] or default
opt-in to install potentially unwanted software.
The ecosystem of incentivized mobile app installs differs from
desktop app installs in at least two ways. First, users participat-
ing in mobile app installs consciously install an app to receive a
reward, whereas desktop app installs typically occur without the
user’s awareness, such as through deceptive practices, or covertly
on compromised hosts. Second, the apps distributed through the
install campaigns in desktop settings tend to be PUP or malware. In
contrast, the install campaigns in mobile advertise predominantly
benign apps, presumably due to the presence of gatekeepers such
as Google’s Play Protect program to prevent the distribution of
malware. Furthermore, incentivized install providers seem to base
their business on artificially increasing the reputation of the apps
with the goal of driving future business opportunities and revenues.
Reputation Manipulation. Prior work has studied reputation
manipulation on online social networks to artificially inflate social
metrics such as likes, followers, or retweets in Facebook, Twitter,
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and Instagram [25–27, 32, 57, 58, 61, 63]. Similar to install counts of
mobile apps, manipulating these metrics can increase the perceived
value of a social media profile. Incentivized mobile app installs differ
from social network reputation manipulation in the ecosystem of
key actors and the methods they employ, such as detailed task
“offers” distributed to crowd workers through a network of affiliate
apps instead of using automation. These tasks often go beyond
the mere installation of apps, requesting for example that workers
reach a certain level in a game, or make in-app purchases before
they can get paid.
ManipulatingApp StoreCharts.Adifferent line of prior work fo-
cused on the detection of app ranking manipulation in marketplaces
according to publicly available metrics such as reviews, ratings, and
ranking patterns of apps in app stores’ top charts [23, 47, 49, 66].
For example, Zhu et al. [66] built a statistical behavioral model of
historical ranking patterns and the rating score of apps to detect
manipulation. In contrast, our work detects actual apps engaging
in manipulation by monitoring “offer walls” rather than making
statistical inferences. Our methodology reveals tasks aiming to
manipulate app store metrics that are not publicly visible and not
targeted at improving the app’s standing in the app store, such as
inflating in-app revenue or user engagement. Prior work has also
interviewed fraudsters selling fake installs, reviews, and ratings in
Google Play Store to reveal their operational characteristics [31, 48].
While we do not directly interact with the people behind the incen-
tivized install platforms, our work sheds light on the ecosystem at
scale, and provides new insights into how these services operate, as
well as how app developers may stand to benefit from using these
services.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided an in-depth analysis of the ecosystem of
incentivized installs on Google Play Store by purchasing installs
for our honey app and monitoring IIPs. We find that most of the
users are potentially crowd workers installing apps advertised on
IIPs to earn money. Our results also showed that IIPs can have
negative effects on the app store and beyond (e.g., deceitfully raise
funding and erode consumer trust) due to their ability to manipulate
user engagement metrics. Finally, our results demonstrate a likely
lack of enforcement from Google Play Store to detect the potential
violations of their policies by incentivized installs.
Our methodology to investigate IIPs could be deployed to pro-
vide a semi-automated monitoring service of IIPs. This could be
leveraged by the Google Play Store to act on potential violations of
its terms and services. It could also be leveraged by apps conducting
non-incentivized marketing campaigns to detect if a third-party
is deceiving them and delivering incentivized installs, and by in-
vestors during due diligence investigations. We believe this would
help increase the trustworthiness of user engagement metrics in
Google Play Store.
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